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Cosmopolitanism, Communitarianism and the Subaltern
This essay takes as its point of departure, the debate between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in international 
normative theory. It expresses several dissatisfactions with this debate, 
criticizing its inattention to politics and history, its Eurocentrism, 
and the simplistic imageries of threat on which attitudes towards 
boundaries in the debate are premised. In attempting to remedy these 
problems, it recasts the figure of the subaltern that haunts this debate 
— hitherto imagined as a passive recipient of Western largesse — 
as an active agent struggling for emancipation, and contrasts the 
potentials of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism to function as 
vocabularies in which such struggles might be articulated. The chapter 
then turns to the writings of two proto-postcolonial thinkers — James 
Joyce and Rabindranath Tagore — who reject the conventional 
opposition between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. 
Through a selective reading of their thought, it argues that rather 
than resolving the cosmopolitan/communitarian impasse, the tension 
between these normative worldviews running through their oeuvres, 
offers a protest sensibility that is better suited to the exigencies of 
subaltern struggle in the contemporary conjuncture. 
International normative theory has been the site of a vigorous 
debate on the scope of justice. Those who regard this as universal 
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— ‘cosmopolitans’ — weigh equally the claims of all individuals who 
would be affected by policies or institutional arrangements, out of a 
belief in the equal worth of humanity in all persons.1  Their critics are 
diverse, but one influential subset — ‘communitarians’ — argue that 
norms of justice can only arise from within bounded communities. 
In their view, the content of a community — its norms, values, 
traditions — is constitutive of a sense of justice.2  In some versions 
of this thesis, the nation is seen as the politically most salient form 
of the community for this purpose.3  One important consequence of 
regarding communities as sources of ethical value in their own right 
and boundaries as having irreducible ethical significance, is that it 
becomes permissible — sometimes obligatory — to ascribe priority to 
members of the community over non-members in certain contexts. 
The different voices in this debate address the question of what 
obligations we owe to which others. Questions of political obligation 
become particularly vexed in the context of global problems of serious 
magnitude such as genocide, poverty and climate change, where the 
‘others’ in question are people with whom we may share few of the ties 
that apparently bind us to fellow nationals. While the questions speak 
to urgent underlying issues, they have been framed in problematic 
ways. 
First, a great deal of international normative theory is concerned 
largely with elaborating a normative framework that will usher in 
a more just world. This endeavour focuses mainly on the content 
of norms, while remaining insufficiently attentive to the political 
mechanisms by which norms are enforced or undermined, or the 
history of ideas and practices associated with such norms. Yet 
politics is inescapable, as Fred Dallmayr reminds us,4  because norms 
do not translate directly into praxis but require interpretation and 
application, both of which raise deeply political questions (who has 
the right of interpretation?; and in case of conflict, who is entitled to 
adjudicate between different interpretations?). And history is crucial 
because the legitimacy of norms may be shaped by perceptions of 
their provenance and praxis (where have they come from?; what has 
been done in their name?).
Second, although the charge of Eurocentrism has long been 
levelled against Western political theory, it does not seem to have 
had much impact in the field of what passes as ‘international’ 
normative theory. This field is international in its aspirations, in that 
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it is concerned with the ethics of world ordering. Yet it is dominated 
by Euro-American theorists (or theorists working in Euro-American 
universities), and its theoretical production makes little reference 
to the lifeworlds of subjects outside the West. Consider attitudes 
towards nationalism, as a case in point. The cosmopolitan literature’s 
antipathy towards nationalism is indelibly marked by the Western 
experience of nationalism, in which a discourse that begins as a 
struggle to democratize absolutist states becomes yoked to those states 
in projects of imperialism and fascism. There is little cognisance in 
this literature of the postcolonial attachment to nationalism, which, 
despite the subsequent depredations of postcolonial states, continues 
to see nationalism as the vehicle that delivered the very condition 
of Latin American, African and Asian postcoloniality.5  The relative 
novelty and fragility of this transition in many parts of the world only 
reinforces the intensity of this attachment. 
This inattention to history and politics is encouraged by the 
methodological assumption that the content of justice can be 
known in its entirety by engaging in thought experiments of the sort 
recommended by John Rawls.6  Following Rawls, it has been widely 
supposed that conceptions of global justice might be articulated by 
imagining what it would be rational for reasonable individuals to 
conclude as being in their interest, were they to operate in ignorance 
of their citizenship and nationality (among other indications of their 
station in life).7  The Rawlsian ‘original position’ is a device that claims 
to arrive at universal norms of justice by abstracting from particular 
experience. But the Rawlsian choosing procedure cannot claim to be 
universalistic, even on its own terms, unless the contracting parties 
in the original position operated, not only in ignorance of their own 
interests, but with substantial knowledge of subaltern lives that might 
inform their suppositions about what it would be rational to desire if 
they were ever to find themselves in the position of the subaltern.8   By 
and large, the Rawlsian-inspired global justice literature makes little 
reference to the lifeworlds of subaltern ‘others’.  
I use the term ‘subaltern’ in the inexact but nonetheless useful 
sense suggested by the historian Ranajit Guha, who uses the category 
to refer to all non-elite ‘classes and groups constituting the mass of 
the labouring population and the intermediate strata in town and 
country’.9  In postcolonial and subaltern studies, the term is usually 
interpreted broadly to include any person or group of inferior rank 
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whether because of class, race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity or 
any other identity. The adoption of a subaltern vantage point calls for 
a reframing of the central preoccupations of international normative 
theory. Debates between cosmopolitans and nationalists typically 
focus on the question: ‘what obligations do we owe strangers?’ But 
the question betrays an elitist conception of its audience. Anyone 
teetering on the brink of existence, on account of material deprivation 
or persecution, might be forgiven for not giving the question of 
their obligations to strangers much consideration. The question is of 
universal philosophical significance, for even those most marginalized 
in some contexts will occupy positions of power in others, in which 
capacity they might be well placed to harm strangers in their midst. 
But it fails as an opening gambit, politically and psychologically, insofar 
as its intention is to initiate a global conversation about justice. To ask 
what obligations one owes strangers seems to presuppose an audience 
that can afford the luxury of thinking about strangers. The political 
economy of the field of academic cosmopolitanism means that the 
question is usually posed by Western authors to privileged Western 
audiences, with a view to persuading them to treat outsiders with 
respect. This is a laudable objective, but one that does not engage with 
the subaltern outsider. Can s/he be expected to be cosmopolitan too? 
Liberal cosmopolitan thinkers identify individuality, universality 
and generality as their fundamental philosophical premises: in 
other words, individuals are the ultimate units of concern, equally, 
for everyone.10  This means that it should be possible for everyone 
to espouse a cosmopolitan worldview. Yet the preoccupations of 
subaltern outsiders are likely to be rather different from those of 
satiated insiders. Rather than asking ‘what do we owe strangers?’, a 
more pressing question from their perspective might be ‘what’s in it for 
us?’ Turning the question around in this way invites us, as normative 
theorists, to recast the figure of the subaltern that haunts our debates 
— hitherto imagined as a passive recipient of Western largesse — 
as an active agent struggling for emancipation, and to consider the 
potentials of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism to function 
as vocabularies in which such struggle might be articulated. This, in 
turn, could have larger implications for the re-imagination of political 
pluralism, multiculturalism, and other theoretical attempts at the 
articulation of diversity in the context of larger wholes (whether of 
the ‘nation’ or indeed ‘humanity’ itself).  
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Prima facie, cosmopolitanism’s promise of universal inclusion 
appears appealing from a subaltern point of view. Its promise to 
weigh equally the claims of every person who would be affected 
by the choice of particular policies could have radical distributive 
implications.11  Conversely, the communitarian claim that it is 
permissible or necessary to give ethical priority to one’s compatriots 
appears to be a profoundly selfish one, given the gross inequalities 
that exist between political communities in the world today. But to 
leave the argument here would be to engage purely with the ethical 
content of cosmopolitan norms, while ignoring their genealogy and 
the socio-historical conditions of their production. 
Even a brief consideration of the history of cosmopolitanism in 
Western thought reveals its deep implication in the conception 
and practice of empire and capitalism. Anthony Pagden has argued 
persuasively that European ideas of cosmopolitanism emerged in 
tandem with the spread of European empires: 
just as Cicero was writing as the Roman republic was being replaced by 
the Roman Empire, so Zeno was writing at the very moment that the 
independent Greek city states were being absorbed into Alexander’s 
‘world’ empire . . . one of the greatest of the Roman Stoics [Marcus 
Aurelius] was also an emperor, and . . . Seneca wrote for Nero’.12  
Similarly, he writes that it was Enlightenment cosmopolitans who 
often advanced moral justifications for later exercises in European 
imperialism.13  Stoic, Cynic and Enlightenment cosmopolitanisms may 
have emerged in tandem with the spread of empires, partly because 
the ideas of universal moral community that they recommended 
seemed practicable in precisely those times and places where universal 
political communities (that is, empires) were being constructed, and 
partly also because those ideas provided attractive justifications for 
projects of empire-building.
Analogously, Petter Korkman has suggested that cosmopolitanism 
is in some way an offspring of the global capitalist world market. Early 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf 
and Emerich de Vattel, saw the cultivation of cosmopolitan sentiments 
of a universal love for humanity as motivated by primarily egoistic 
considerations. In this view, human beings’ desire for survival (but 
also their greed for superfluities) necessitates trade and commerce, 
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which in turn demands the cultivation of universal sociability. 
Commerce is seen to play a civilizing role in international relations, 
so that the promotion of commerce becomes both rational and a 
matter of moral duty. Because trade is enabled by the institution of 
private property, the moral imperative to promote trade is in effect 
one to impose property rights — by force if necessary — on those 
parts of the world that do not yet recognize them. The language of 
individual liberal rights and duties are ultimately an expression of this 
effort to reorganize human relations as market relations. Universal 
community is, therefore, not an end in itself, but a means to the end 
of carrying out business, with cosmopolitan sociability functioning as 
the ideological superstructure of a world capitalist market.14  Little 
wonder, then, that critics have noted that ideas of world citizenship 
have been championed by, or at least come most readily to, elites who 
are able to experience a sense of inhabitation of the world as a whole 
thanks to their ability to travel and transact across borders, armed 
with visa-friendly passports and credit cards.15  
One is tempted to suggest that although the praxis of 
cosmopolitanism by elites might be good for subalterns, subalterns 
themselves could never be cosmopolitans. Nor would they want 
to be. While the material self-sufficiency of elite cosmopolitan 
theorists confirms them in their individualism and enables them to 
recommend the repudiation of particularistic attachments such as 
ethnic solidarities, such attachments are often a resource for effective 
political action and mutual support among the less powerful.16  If 
inclusion in the polis has usually had to be fought for, the subaltern as 
an individual would appear to stand little chance in that fight without 
a strengthening of collective consciousness. Historically, perhaps it is 
communitarianism — and more particularly, nationalism — which 
has been the instinctive vocabulary of grievance and resistance: one 
thinks here of Isaiah Berlin’s view of nationalism as ‘a response to a 
wound inflicted upon a society’.17  
Compelling as they may seem, these conclusions would be too 
hasty. Marx and Engels’ famous declaration that ‘the working 
men have no country’,18  echoed by Virginia Woolf in respect 
of women,19  might be regarded as exhortations to cosmopolitan 
resistance addressed to subalterns. As efforts to forge new forms of 
community across national boundaries, working-class and feminist 
internationalisms might be seen as attempts to fashion subaltern 
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cosmopolitanisms. As for the political economy of the cosmopolitan 
gaze, there is much to be said for the possibility of subaltern access 
to cosmopolitan scripts. Adapting Benedict Anderson’s account 
of the origins of nationalism to the conditions of a globalizing 
world,20  Arjun Appadurai has suggested that we are witnessing 
the emergence of ‘post-national’ communities. Just as New World 
nations were imagined in particular ways corresponding to the 
migratory and professional mobility options of creole elites conjoined 
with the phenomenon of ‘print capitalism’, global migration and mass 
media now provide the basis for the imagination of post-national 
communities.21  In Appadurai’s view, migration is not the prerogative 
of the privileged: the demographic basis for a post-national world is 
provided as much by refugees, migrant labour, trafficked women and 
illegal aliens, as by wealthy frequent flyers. One might object that the 
link between cosmopolitanism and mobility (even subaltern mobility) 
begs questions about the possibilities of cosmopolitan identification 
for the subaltern immobile.22  Yet even as labour flows are policed 
ever more stringently by states, flows of capital and information 
might be seen as foisting a sort of ‘forced cosmopolitanism’ on rooted 
subalterns, albeit unevenly. If anyone can live in locales entirely 
of their own creation, it is the powerful; the weak find it harder to 
resist the encroachment of external influences and the consequent 
cosmopolitanization of their lives. 
Attitudes towards boundaries in the debate between cosmopolitan-
ism and communitarianism tend to be premised, even if only 
implicitly, on assumptions about the locus of threats to fundamental 
interests, with boundaries regarded as potential defences against those 
threats. The debate might therefore be seen as a conversation about 
the relationship between space, threat and boundaries. One further 
aspect of this debate that appears naïve from a subaltern perspective is 
that hegemonic variants of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism 
frequently adopt simplistic assumptions about the locus of threat. 
Many liberal cosmopolitans are keen to minimize the importance 
of state sovereignty precisely because they see the post-colonial state 
as the primary locus of threat to human rights and the ‘international’ 
as the source of remedies. In Charles Beitz’s view, to give just one 
example, 
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the role of human rights in international political discourse has two 
aspects: first, human rights may serve to justify interference in the 
internal affairs of states or other local communities; second, they may 
argue for various external agents, such as international organisations 
and other states, to commit the resources required for effective 
interference’.23    
Missing from this analysis is any acknowledgement that human 
rights might be threatened by global structures such as capitalism or 
actors external to the state. As Anne Orford has demonstrated,24  
contemporary narratives of intervention are informed by a spatial 
allocation of culpability in which problems are represented as arising 
from local dynamics internal to the putatively dysfunctional states 
that are the objects of intervention, while the ‘international’ is read 
as a sanitized space populated by heroic actors ready to rescue people 
in these benighted locales. Conversely, communitarian voices — 
emanating both from within the academy25  and the ranks of postcolonial 
elites — have tended to valorize state sovereignty by exaggerating the 
risks of neocolonial predation by external actors and obscuring the 
culpability of postcolonial states in impeding the enjoyment of self-
determination by their societies. One thinks here of the frequent use 
of anti-imperialism by postcolonial elites as a rhetorical shield behind 
which to bludgeon domestic opponents into submission.26  Hegemonic 
understandings of both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism 
seem to need the presence of sanitized spaces — the ‘international’ 
for the cosmopolitan, the ‘state’ or ‘political community’ for the 
communitarian — from which salvation will be forthcoming. 
In contrast, taking its cue from the Subaltern Studies historio-
graphy, which reads the subaltern as disenfranchised by both the 
colonial and native bourgeoisie, this essay starts from the premise 
that threats to the subaltern agency are located both outside and 
within the political communities in which they find themselves. Ill-
served by both hegemonic cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, 
subaltern attitudes towards boundaries cannot assume the existence 
of sanitized spaces: indeed to be subaltern is not to have a safe space, 
but always to have to struggle to create one. If this is the case, how 
might subalterns think about actually existing state boundaries? 
In the following section, I present the views of two proto-
postcolonial thinkers — James Joyce and Rabindranath Tagore — 
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who complicate the received wisdom on the putative oppositionality 
of cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Both were critics of nationalism, 
even as they desired the success of the national liberation movements 
with which they were associated. They advocated cosmopolitan 
sensibilities in the high noon of nationalism, while remaining unwilling 
to completely repudiate nationalism. Their refusal to commit to 
either side of this political theoretic divide seems to have come from 
an awareness that subaltern self-determination was threatened both 
from within and outside the political communities they were helping 
to imagine. This awareness of the diffuse nature of threat seems to 
have induced them to occupy a space between cosmopolitanism 
and communitarianism, in which boundaries are seen as potential 
instruments of both repression and refuge. 
å
James Joyce and Rabindranath Tagore 
When a signature petition in support of world peace, disarmament, 
and a host of other worthy internationalist causes begins to circulate 
in his college, Stephen Dedalus — the protagonist of James Joyce’s 
bildungsroman A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man — is not 
impressed. At first, the lofty goals of the campaign elicit his weary 
disinterest, but he is also angered by the absurdity of their being urged 
on the world by one of its absolutist monarchs — Tsar Nicholas II 
of Russia. Less aware of these international political dynamics, 
Dedalus’s friend Davin — described as a simple-minded peasant boy, 
steeped in the myths of Ireland and widely thought of in the college 
as a ‘young fenian’ — has signed the petition. When a bemused and 
scornful Dedalus asks him whether this means that he has turned 
his back on Irish nationalism, Davin is perplexed. Confounded by 
Dedalus’s refusal to support pacific internationalism and his insistent 
mockery of Irish nationalism, it seems to Davin as if Dedalus cannot 
give his allegiance to anything or anyone. ‘I can’t understand you’, 
he bursts out. ‘One time I hear you talk against English literature. 
Now you talk against the Irish informers. What with your name and 
your ideas … Are you Irish at all?’27   Davin’s repeated entreaties to 
Dedalus to ‘be one of us’, provokes the latter to a bitter denunciation 
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of Irish nationalism, citing its betrayal of its most loyal sons and its 
suppression of individual freedom. For Dedalus, ‘Ireland is the old 
sow that eats her farrow’.28  
Yet, contrary to the conventional reading of Dedalus as wanting 
to leap out of a stultifying provincialism into a liberating post-
national identity, Marjorie Howes has drawn attention to the extent 
to which he continues to inhabit the very intellectual structures 
that he disavows. Even as he rejects the prevailing forms of cultural 
nationalism, vowing to ‘fly by’ the ‘nets’ of nationality, language and 
religion (in an allusion to the classical tale of Daedalus and Icarus), 
he continues to think of the ‘nation’ in precisely the terms those forms 
offer him.29  In a reading influenced by David Lloyd’s account of the 
centrality of the autobiographical form to nationalist discourse, Emer 
Nolan argues that although Dedalus is devoted to the elaboration 
of a narrative that is diametrically opposed to the aspirations of 
contemporary cultural nationalism, ‘none the less the aestheticist 
self-creation offered by Dedalus offers a structural homology to the 
artistic mission to which it is ostensibly opposed. In his resolutely 
individualistic self-fashioning, Dedalus ironically re-enacts the 
self-making and self-discovery of the nationalist cultural project’.30  
Indeed, the novel closes with his determination to ‘forge in the smithy 
of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race’31  — an enterprise 
that many nationalists would be happy to claim as their own. 
Dedalus’s ironic nationalism parallel’s Joyce’s relationship to the 
Irish Literary Revival, of which he was a critical member — both in 
the sense of being important and dissenting.32  While critical of the 
exclusivist ‘Irish Ireland’ current of the Revival and of the caricature of 
Irishness being produced by it, Ireland continued to play a central role 
in his work, placing Joyce — in common with other leading members 
of the Revival — at the heart of the project of ‘narrating the nation’. 
Yet as Seamus Deane has written, whereas for the revivalists the idea 
of Ireland was an invigorating and positive force, for Joyce it was a 
negative place which threatened artistic freedom and squandered 
the talents of its people.33  The ends of liberation were best served, 
in Joyce’s view, not by drawing flattering portraits of this society by 
romanticizing its rural and peasant life, but by subjecting it to the gaze 
of an unflinching realism that rendered Irish life in all its desperation, 
poverty and ugliness. In Deane’s reading of Joyce’s project: 
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If Ireland was to be seen, it would be in the full light of an Ibsenite 
dawn, not in the glimmer of a Celtic twilight . . .The mirror held up 
to Culture was going to reflect a reality no-one had presented before. 
Dublin would find it an unwelcome sight, but Dublin and Ireland 
would be liberated by it.34  
But it was not only Irish nationalism that was the target of Joyce’s 
withering gaze. In his short story ‘After the Race’, Jimmy, an Irishman, 
cavorts with a group of continental and other acquaintances after 
a day spent watching cars race each other. When at the after-race 
party, Jimmy gets into a political argument with the Englishman 
Routh, threatening to strain the atmosphere of cosmopolitan 
camaraderie, the host attempts to defuse the situation by proposing 
a toast ‘to Humanity’.35  Later they drink toasts to Ireland, England, 
France, Hungary and the US, as if to bury their material differences in 
an imagined comity of nations. A card game ensues in which Jimmy 
loses heavily and Routh emerges the winner. There is an insinuation 
of cheating (‘they were devils of fellows’) and the outcome of the 
game seems to reinforce the essential inequality between the Irish 
and English members of the group. Howes has read this story as 
suggesting that ‘cosmopolitanism and universalist ideals can function 
as a covert European nationalism, and can help to sustain imperialism 
rather than to dismantle it’.36  
The key to understanding Joyce’s mockery of both cosmopolitanism 
and nationalism lies in the spatial imaginaries of threat that inform 
his thinking about liberation, visible in his more explicitly political 
writings. In an essay entitled ‘Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages’, 
he is categorical about the culpability of the English in oppressing 
Ireland, declaring that ‘Ireland is poor because English laws destroyed 
the industries of the country . . . because, in the years in which the 
potato crop failed, the negligence of the English government left the 
flower of the people to die of hunger . . .’37  And he is emphatic that 
the Irish have a right to resist their subjection: ‘If a victorious country 
tyrannises over another, it cannot logically take it amiss if the latter 
reacts. Men are made that way; and no one, unless he were blinded 
by self-interest or ingenuity, can still believe that a colonising country 
is prompted by purely Christian motives when it takes over foreign 
shores . . .’38  But he is equally scathing about the local oppressions 
that shackle the Irish, singling out the Catholic Church for especially 
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severe condemnation. As he puts it, ‘I do not see what good it does 
to fulminate against English tyranny while the tyranny of Rome still 
holds the dwelling place of the soul’.39  Deane elaborates on Joyce’s 
understanding of the relationship between these tyrannies: 
The remodelling of the national character, undertaken by groups like 
Sinn Fein and the Irish Revival, is indeed a heroic enterprise, but it is 
a futile one unless it accepts that the remodelling has to begin with the 
problem of fidelity to Rome rather than with the problem of fidelity or 
infidelity towards the British system. It is Rome, not London, which 
rules the Irish mind. London will readily use Rome for its purposes. 
But the Roman imperium is the more subtle and pervasive because it 
encroaches on the territory which should be ruled by the artist.40 
Convinced that Irish freedom was shackled by Rome and London, 
Joyce struggled against these dual tyrannies, ruthlessly parodying 
both the narrow-minded provincialism of Irish nationalism and the 
civilizing pretensions of British imperialism.  
In the same year that Portrait was first published in book form 
(1916), another literary modernist in another British colony 
published a novel called Ghare Baire (translated into English as 
The Home and the World), which expressed a similar refusal of 
imperialism and authoritarian nationalism. In language that echoes 
Dedalus, the autobiographical protagonist of this novel, written by 
the Indian Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore, speaks of the need 
to ‘save the country from the thousand-and-one-snares — of religion, 
custom and selfishness’, which nationalists were laying.41  It is no 
coincidence that two novelists from Ireland and India crafted these 
fictional kindred spirits contemporaneously, given their location in 
comparable discursive fields. Early twentieth-century Ireland and 
Tagore’s native state of Bengal were in many ways remarkably similar 
places, characterized by a comparable mixture of different forms of 
anti-colonial protest: constitutional agitation, cultural nationalism, 
mass-based passive resistance in the form of strikes and boycotts 
punctuated by sporadic acts of terrorism and insurrection.42 
Set in Bengal at the height of the Swadeshi movement (1903–
08) against the proposed partition of the province, The Home and 
the World personifies the conflict between cosmopolitanism and 
nationalism as seen from the vantage point of a nation attempting 
to wrest its freedom from imperial rule, in the form of a love triangle 
Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism ³ 177
involving two men and a woman. Most readings of the novel see 
cosmopolitanism as personified in the character of Nikhil, a wealthy 
but enlightened zamindar, whose progressiveness is manifested in 
his views on gender relations, the welfare of his tenants and, most 
crucially for the narrative, his views on nationalist agitation. Nikhil is 
a supporter of the goals of the Swadeshi movement (aiming at Swaraj 
or self-rule), but critical of its methods. In particular, he refuses to 
use his authority as a zamindar to enforce the nationalist injunction 
against buying British-made goods, knowing full well that the impact 
of the boycott is likely to fall hardest on the poor. Nikhil’s friend Sandip 
personifies nationalism. Passionately committed to the success of the 
Swadeshi movement, Sandip unapologetically uses Hindu religious 
symbolism in an effort to primordialize the nationalist identity he 
seeks to construct. When this alienates the Muslim minority, who 
also bear the commercial brunt of the boycott in their capacity as 
petty traders reliant on the sale of foreign cloth, he unhesitatingly 
advocates the use of coercion to bring them into line.
Nikhil’s wife Bimala occupies a pivotal position in the novel, 
torn between the values espoused by the two men.43  Symbolizing 
Bengal, she is the terrain on which the two men duel, the prize for 
whose affection they compete, but also the arbiter of the novel — 
her modulating feelings towards the male characters are an allegory 
for public perceptions of the political efficacy of their competing 
worldviews. Bimala becomes increasingly enamoured of Sandip’s fiery 
rhetoric, which seems to offer a more potent form of political agency 
able to deliver the nation from imperialist subjugation. Conversely, 
she becomes intellectually and sexually estranged from Nikhil, whose 
less heroic preoccupations with social work appear unpromising 
as a means of political emancipation. But Bimala is increasingly 
assailed by doubt. Sandip has persuaded her to steal money from her 
husband’s safe for the nationalist cause — an act that she regrets 
almost immediately as it begins to vitiate her relationships with 
members of the household. Meanwhile, Sandip’s political activism 
is beginning to wreak havoc in the world outside. When Swadeshi 
activists punish Muslims found contravening the boycott, communal 
tensions erupt in riots. But Bimala’s second thoughts come too late 
to save her relationship with Nikhil, who is fatally wounded in the 
course of trying to quell the unrest. 
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Bimala’s remorse at the end of the novel is usually read as a 
vindication of Nikhil’s position, shot through with the pessimistic 
sentiment that Sandip’s views are politically more resonant in 
the world. Martha Nussbaum,44  for example, has read the book 
as the ‘tragic story of the defeat of a reasonable and principled 
cosmopolitanism by the forces of nationalism and ethnocentrism.’ 
This is too simple a reading, particularly given the broader context 
of her article, which appears to set up an opposition between 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Nikhil straddles both, his patriotism 
being expressed quite emphatically in his endorsement of the goals 
of Swadeshi, in his (admittedly disillusioned) financial support for 
Sandip, and in his unceasing efforts to redefine rather than cede 
the patriotic space.45  The novel is therefore more plausibly read as 
a conflict between two forms of patriotism, as suggested by Ashis 
Nandy46  — one that is unreasoned, authoritarian and demagogic, 
and another that is critical, reflective and uncoerced. But Nandy’s 
reading, like Nussbaum’s, remains too one-sided in its persistence in 
seeing the novel as a critique of the politics of Sandip alone.
The Home and the World is also a critique of Nikhil and his 
politics of cosmopolitanism. In a highly persuasive reading, Michael 
Sprinker has suggested that Nikhil is not merely ineffectual but also 
deeply paternalistic in his insistence on bestowing his conception of 
freedom on others.47  This is most obvious in his attempts to educate, 
modernize and ‘civilize’ Bimala, something that Nikhil acknowledges 
as a cause of their estrangement in a moment of self-flagellating 
introspection.48  There is no corresponding auto-critique of the 
conservatism of Nikhil’s politics of rescue-from-above insofar as this 
operates across class lines. In a crucial sub-plot, Nikhil takes in a poor 
tenant (Panchu) who has been evicted by a nationalist zamindar as 
punishment for contravening the Swadeshi boycott. This episode 
contrasts the good zamindar (Nikhil) with the bad zamindar (Harish 
Kundu), but zamindari per se does not come under attack. 
Nonetheless, even Tagore’s limited critique of Nikhil suggests 
that The Home and the World is as critical of the benevolent civilizing 
pretensions of imperialism and universalist modernization, as it is of 
nationalism. Indeed, in having both male protagonists exit the scene 
towards the end of the novel, Tagore repudiates both cosmopolitanism 
and nationalism, leaving Bimala alone to reconsider the trajectory of 
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her self-assertion. In silencing both male characters at the end, Tagore 
was recommending neither of them. This alternative reading is borne 
out by Tagore’s more didactic pronouncements on cosmopolitanism 
and nationalism, in which he distanced himself from both polarities. 
In an essay on nationalism published a year after The Home and 
the World, he declared that ‘neither the colourless vagueness of 
cosmopolitanism, nor the fierce self-idolatory of nation-worship, is 
the goal of human history’.49  Elsewhere, he concludes a reflection on 
identity politics in education with the hope that ‘the institutions we 
are setting up today express both our national and our cosmopolitan 
consciousness’.50  But what did this mean?
Tagore’s attitude towards nationalism was shaped by his encounter 
with the Swadeshi movement, of which he was initially a leader, 
but later a critic.51  The change seems to have been precipitated by 
his growing awareness of the extent to which the movement relied 
on coercion for its effectiveness. Such coercion typically took the 
form of destruction of property, physical intimidation and assault, 
social ostracism or the use of caste-sanctions against those found 
violating the nationalist injunction against patronizing foreign goods 
or institutions.52  The result was a serious alienation of subaltern 
groups such as Muslims and lower-caste Namasudra peasants, and 
the eventual eruption of Hindu–Muslim riots in East Bengal in 1906–
07, all of which were fictionalized in the violent denouement of The 
Home and the World. This early awareness of the subaltern experience 
of nationalism later developed into a more profound critique, 
expressed in a series of lectures delivered in Japan and the United 
States in 1916–17. Here, Tagore criticizes nationalism as a powerful 
mass delusion, under the influence of which ‘the whole people can 
carry out its systematic programme of the most virulent self-seeking 
without being in the least aware of its moral perversion’.53  He accuses 
nationalism of fostering ill-will between nations on account of its 
triumphalist exceptionalism, and of curtailing individual freedom 
within nations.54  These criticisms of nationalism recur in a series 
of public disagreements with Gandhi,55  in which Tagore is pained 
by Gandhi’s mobilization of popular prejudice to serve nationalist 
ends as exemplified, for instance, by the latter’s characterization 
of the 1934 Bihar earthquake as divine retribution for the practice 
of untouchability, or his advocacy of a boycott of foreign cloth by 
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describing it as ‘impure’. Perhaps most controversially, he was irritated 
by Gandhi’s suggestion that every Indian spin khadi on a charkha 
or spinning wheel — an activity that Gandhi viewed as a collective 
egalitarian project symbolizing the dignity of labour, but that Tagore 
saw as promoting a mind-numbing uniformity that crushed individual 
creativity and rebellion.
Tagore’s critique did not capture the public imagination, 
partly because he was ahead of his time, writing in the high noon 
of nationalism, but partly also because of his failure to articulate 
alternatives to the political institutions he was criticizing. At times 
it seemed as if he was not interested in politics, with education and 
social reform taking priority.56  Far from constituting a retreat from 
politics, this attitude stemmed from an understanding of imperialism, 
not as the cause of India’s ailments, but as symptomatic of pre-
existing social evils such as casteism and unreflective adherence to 
anachronistic traditions. Without serious attention to these internal 
weaknesses, he believed that independence from Britain would simply 
leave India vulnerable to other predators.57  Tagore viewed politics 
as a superstructural realm resting on a social base.58  Education and 
social reform took higher priority because they would lay the social 
foundations upon which a more emancipatory political system could 
be built.
It is therefore to his writings on culture, rather than politics, that 
we must look to observe the tension between cosmopolitanism and 
nationalism articulated most clearly. It is impossible in the course 
of a brief essay like this one to do justice to Tagore’s unparalleled 
contribution to the Bengali literary and artistic canon in the form of 
novels, short stories, plays, essays, songs, poems and paintings. His 
commitment to the revival of the Bengali language was accompanied 
by a strong emphasis on vernacular education and the occasionally 
expressed worry that the excessive use of English would lead Indians 
to turn exclusively towards the West for inspiration.59  This did not 
make Tagore a cultural nationalist. It was more his way of preparing 
the ground for an egalitarian interaction of cultures. 
Tagore was passionately committed to the interaction of cultures, 
both from a normative conviction that universal Truth could only 
be revealed through the comparative study of cultures,60  and from 
a historical appreciation of the inescapable hybridity of all cultures, 
including those of the Indian subcontinent.61  He welcomed contact 
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with British and European cultures as the latest in a long series of 
external influences that he likened to tributaries feeding the stream 
of Indian thought. He lauded these influences as ‘providential’ on 
account of their revitalizing effect on an Indian culture that had 
grown stagnant and unreflective, insisting that India had much to 
learn from Europe not only in material but also in moral and cultural 
respects.62 
Yet he was keen that such interaction should take place in an 
egalitarian fashion and painfully aware that this was not yet the case.63  
His argument for cultural cosmopolitanism is, therefore, qualified in 
the following way:
[B]efore we are in a position to face other world cultures, or cooperate 
with them, we must build up our own by the synthesis of the diverse 
elements that have come to India. When we take our stand at such a 
centre and turn towards the West, our gaze shall no longer be timid 
and dazed, our heads shall remain erect. For, we shall then be able to 
look at truth from our own vantage ground and open out a new vista 
of thought before the grateful world.64  
Elsewhere, he writes that ‘when we have the intellectual capital of 
our own, the commerce of thought with the outer world becomes 
natural and fully profitable’; but adds almost in the same breath that 
‘to say that such commerce is inherently wrong, is to encourage the 
worst form of provincialism, productive of nothing but intellectual 
indigence’.65  A similar tension between openness and rootedness is 
encoded in a series of natural metaphors scattered across a number 
of other writings: 
We must not, in foolish pride, still keep ourselves fast within the shell 
of the seed and the crust of the earth which protected and nourished 
our ideals; for these, the shell and the crust, were meant to be broken, 
so that life may spring up in all its vigour and beauty, bringing its 
offerings to the world in open light.66 
 The butterfly will have to be persuaded that the freedom of the sky 
is of higher value than the shelter of the cocoon.67 
 The nursery of the infant should be secluded, its cradle safe. But the 
same seclusion, if continued after the infant has grown up, makes it 
weak in body and mind.68 
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Tagore is not a cultural protectionist, for he remarks unsentimentally 
that when the barriers separating cultures are broken down, ‘only 
that will survive which is basically consistent with the universal’, 
and later, that cultures ‘must pass the test of the world-market, if 
their maximum value is to be obtained’.69  It is clear, though, that he 
believes seeds, cocoons and cradles to be necessary — for a time — to 
provide the space within which to build the intellectual capital that 
makes intercultural exchange mutually profitable. If these are seen 
as metaphors for nationalist identity-consolidation, then we might 
read Tagore as making a case for nationalism and its boundaries as a 
necessary, but necessarily temporary, stage through which subaltern 
cultures must pass before they could interact on equal terms with 
hegemonic cultures.  
Beyond Nationalism-as-transitory-stage
Joyce and Tagore are relevant to the concerns of this essay because 
they complicate the oft-reiterated opposition between nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism, but more particularly because they are 
concerned with the implications of both for subaltern liberation. 
As literary artists, they are critical of nationalism’s stifling of the 
individual spirit. Yet their literary oeuvres work in ironic alliance 
with the nationalists, ‘narrating the nation’, restoring pride in 
language and place, and helping to imagine the political community 
that struggles for the achievement of sovereign statehood. There is 
an acute sensitivity in the moment in which they are writing, to the 
impediments to subaltern liberation emanating from both within and 
outside the political communities that they are actively helping to 
produce. Tagore, in particular, attempts to mitigate this tension by 
regarding nationalism as a transitory stage through which subaltern 
resistance must pass, but which upon achieving its goal of recognition 
of equal worth must subsume itself in universality. But is the work of 
nationalism completed with the achievement of sovereign statehood? 
Is the political sensibility of these writers appropriate only to the 
moment of the emergence of insurgent nations into international 
society, or does it offer a more enduring way of thinking about 
boundaries and identity from the perspective of the subaltern?
To think this through, let us shift the temporal focus from the 
moment of emergence to one of a postcolonial crisis in which the very 
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viability of the nation-state as a political community is questioned in 
conditions of contemporary capitalism. Neo-Gramscian scholars have 
suggested that, far from withering away as a result of the operation of 
neoliberal capital, the postcolonial state has been ‘internationalized’.70  
This is a condition in which elites develop close linkages with external 
actors, either out of self-interest, or because the state has become 
beholden to those actors for its survival in moments of vulnerability 
such as indebtedness. In such circumstances, the state’s need for, and 
responsibilities to, global capital, begin to take precedence over its 
obligations to its subaltern classes. 
A small but significant section of the anti-capitalist movement 
regards the state as irredeemably mortgaged to capital and, therefore, 
writes it out of the utopias it struggles for.71  But others such as 
Samir Amin have argued that internationalized states might yet be 
‘renationalized’ via popular nationalist movements in the periphery.72  
Amin believes that only a universalist social and political consciousness 
can regulate the global economy, but this is a socialist cosmopolitanism 
that relies on the success of popular peripheral nationalisms. These 
would not be nationalisms for new states and would be distinct 
from the official nationalist discourses wielded by states. They are 
perhaps better seen as ‘nationalisms against the state’,73  intended to 
democratize unrepresentative states — typically, by raising the spectre 
of neocolonial invasion, resuscitating the old heroes and forgotten 
ideals of arrested national revolutions and accusing the postcolonial 
state of having betrayed the historic promises on the basis of which 
it came into existence. Insofar as popular nationalisms can perform 
this democratizing role, rather than being relegated to a transitory 
adolescent phase, nationalism should perhaps be seen as a recurring 
and potentially renewing discourse that has the capacity to repair the 
unmooring of the state from its nations, and that might be allied to 
larger projects of global redistribution.74  To map such articulations 
of nationalism and cosmopolitanism onto actually existing agents 
is a risky endeavour. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to find social 
movements in the space of ‘anti-globalization’ protests that appear, on 
the one hand to articulate a ‘nationalism against the state’, and on the 
other, to frame their grievances in cosmopolitan terms, often with a 
view to attracting the support of international allies who might help to 
pressure their otherwise hostile or unresponsive states into becoming 
more representative of their nations.75  
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This continued articulation of cosmopolitanism and nationalism as 
vocabularies of resistance in conjunction with one another — rather 
than as necessarily antinomic —underscores the enduring relevance 
of the sensibilities articulated by the thinkers studied here, beyond 
the temporal contexts in which they were writing. It does, however, 
call into question their view of nationalism as a discourse whose work 
would be accomplished with the achievement of sovereign statehood. 
As I have argued in this essay, both cosmopolitanism and nationalism 
might perform valuable ethico-political work in subaltern resistance, 
even as hegemonic variants of both can also function to disenfranchise 
the subaltern. From a subaltern perspective, then, the question is not 
whether cosmopolitanism or nationalism but when cosmopolitanism 
and nationalism.
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